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THE COST RECOVERY ACT AND
TOBACCO LITIGATION IN CANADA: A
MODEL FOR FAST FOOD LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION

O

besity is a growing problem in Canada.1 One in four Canadian adults is obese, and the number of obese Canadians has doubled since the 1980s.2 Numerous medical conditions
are associated with obesity, including diabetes, hypertension,
heart disease, and cancer.3 As of 2001, obesity related illnesses
cost approximately C$380 million annually in British Columbia
alone.4 This represents approximately 4.5% of British Columbia’s total health care costs.5 The health care costs associated
with these diseases across Canada has also increased from
C$1.55 billion in 2000 to C$1.98 billion in 2008.6 Because Canada utilizes a universal health care system, these costs are
foisted upon the public in the form of taxes.7
Tobacco use is also a problem in British Columbia, where approximately C$525 million are paid to treat tobacco related illnesses. 8 “If 10% of [British Columbia’s] smokers quit, they
would save the [British Columbia] economy approximately $2.9
billion in costs over their lifetimes” in avoided medical care

1. See PUB. HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., OBESITY IN CANADA: A JOINT REPORT
PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY OF CANADA AND THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE
FOR HEALTH INFORMATION 1 (2011) [hereinafter Pub. Health Agency of Can.].
2. See id. at 1.
3. See id. at 2.
4. See Ronald Colman, Cost of Obesity in British Columbia, GPI ATLANTIC
2 (2001).
5. Id.
6. See Pub. Health Agency of Can, supra note 1, at 29. Estimates of the
total economic cost of obesity in Canada, including health care expenditures
and costs in productivity, range from C$4.6 billion to C$7.1 billion annually.
Id.
7. See Jay Marenko, Canada’s Health Care System: An Overview of Public
and Private Participation, MAPLELEAFWEB.COM (Oct. 22, 2010),
http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/canada-s-health-care-systemoverview-public-and-private-participation [hereinafter Marenko Overview].
8. See Jennifer Bridge & Bill Turpin, The Cost of Smoking in British Columbia and the Economics of Tobacco Control, HEALTH CANADA 35 (2004),
available
at
http://www.gpiatlantic.org/pdf/health/tobacco/costoftobaccobc.pdf.
FROM THE
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costs and productivity losses.9 The British Columbia legislature
devised its own way of recouping health care costs associated
with tobacco use when it passed the Tobacco Damages and
Health Care Cost Recovery Act (“Cost Recovery Act”). 10 The
statute authorized British Columbia to initiate litigation
against tobacco manufacturers to recoup health care costs paid
to treat tobacco related illnesses.11 However, when British Columbia initiated a lawsuit against tobacco manufacturers under the Cost Recovery Act, the tobacco manufacturers implead
the Canadian federal government.12 On July 29, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the tobacco manufacturer’s
third-party claim.13 This left the tobacco manufacturers as the
sole defendants in the lawsuit14 and potentially liable for billions of dollars in judgments or settlements.15 The Cost Recovery Act and the ensuing tobacco litigation initiated pursuant to
the Act demonstrate a litigation model that has found some initial success in Canadian courts.16
Historically, plaintiffs bringing claims against food retailers
and manufacturers for contributing to their obesity have had to
overcome causation and assumption of risk issues.17 This Note
examines how the Cost Recovery Act and the modern litigation
strategies developed in tobacco litigation provide a blueprint
for health care cost recovery lawsuits that Canadian provinces
could potentially initiate against manufacturers and retailers
in the food industry.

9. Id. at 53–54.
10. See Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act,
S.B.C. 2000, c. 30 (Can.).
11. See id.
12. See R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] S.C.C. 42 (Can.).
13. See id.
14. See Julia Zebley, Canada Supreme Court Rules Against Tobacco Industry in Two Major Cases, JURIST (July 29, 2011, 12:04 PM),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/07/canada-supreme-court-rules-federalgovernment-not-liable-for-tobacco-related-ailments.php.
15. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Does the World Still Need United States Tort
Law? Or Did It Ever?, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 283, 298 (2011) [hereinafter Cupp
World].
16. See, e.g., R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] S.C.C. 42 (Can.).
17. See generally Brooke Courtney, Is Obesity Really the Next Tobacco?
Lessons Learned from Tobacco for Obesity Litigation, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L.
61, 73–79 (2006).
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Part I of this Note will provide background on Canada’s universal health care system and the tenets of the Canadian
Health Act that make the Cost Recovery Act advantageous to
tobacco litigants. Part II will examine how development of tobacco litigation in the United States influenced Canada’s own
tobacco litigation and what effect it might have on food litigation in Canada. Part III will compare the issues faced by plaintiffs in United States “fast food” litigation to the issues faced by
plaintiffs in tobacco litigation, including assumption of risk and
causation arguments. Part IV of this Note will examine the attributes of the Cost Recovery Act that rebut the causation and
assumption of risk arguments, making the Act an attractive
model for potential future food litigants in Canada.
I. HEALTH CARE IN CANADA
Canada’s universal health care system currently operates as
a mix of private and public entities.18 Physicians work in private practice and bill provincial health insurance plans for
their services.19 Hospitals are run by community boards or volunteer organizations, but they are administered by regional
authorities as non-profit companies, and their operating budgets are determined by provincial health plans.20 Private insurance is effectively prohibited for coverage of any service provided for in provincial health plans and is mainly used for dental
services and prescription drugs.21
18. See Leonard J. Nelson, III, A Tale of Three Systems: A Comparative
Overview of Health Care Reform in England, Canada, and the United States,
37 CUMB. L. REV. 513, 524 (2006/2007).
19. See id.
20. See Marenko Overview, supra note 7.
21. “Canada is also the only country that effectively prohibits private
health insurance for hospital and physician services. Although private medical insurance is not banned specifically by the Canada Health Act, federal
and provincial governments have historically interpreted the Act as intending to ban private insurance. While only six provinces legally prohibit private
medical insurance for medically necessary services, all provinces have other
policies in place that penalize providers who choose to bill privately for services. In practice, private insurance is generally only permitted to cover goods
and services that are not covered by our universal government-run health
insurance plan, mainly dental services and prescription drugs.” Mark Rovere,
Why It’s Time Government Called “Time Out” on the Canada Health Act,
INST.
(Nov.
29,
2010),
FRASER
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/publicationdisplay.aspx?id=17023&terms=HO
W+GOOD+IS+CANADIAN+HEALTH+CARE.
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Canada’s health care system has been the subject of criticism
and political debate.22 For instance, Canada’s health care system has been criticized for having long wait times before a patient can receive specialized care. 23 Even though wait times
have recently decreased, some Canadians still feel that they
are too long.24 In addition, there has been debate over the long
term sustainability of the provincial health care system amid
recent decreases in federal funding.25
Canada took its first step towards its current universal
health care system in 1947 when Saskatchewan adopted a universal hospital care plan that featured province-wide coverage.26 By 1950, British Columbia and Alberta had adopted similar plans,27 and by 1961 all Canadian provinces and territories
provided universal hospital coverage.28 In 1966, Canada’s federal government passed the Medicare Act, which provided federal funding to cover 50% of the provinces’ health care costs
and expanded the insurance coverage to include hospital and
physician services. 29 By 1972, all of Canada’s provinces and
territories were providing the expanded coverage subsidized by
the Medicare Act.30 However, in the late 1970s, the rising costs
of medical care caused Canada to stop paying 50% of the province’s health care costs.31 In the absence of federal health care
reimbursement, provinces were no longer obligated to meet
federal health insurance requirements and were allowed great22. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 526.
23. See Michael M. Rachlis, A Canadian Doctor Diagnoses U.S.
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2009),
Healthcare,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/03/opinion/oe-rachlis3.
24. See Brett J. Skinner, Questioning Success on Health Care Wait Times,
INST.
(Apr.
4,
2011),
FRASER
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/publicationdisplay.aspx?id=17388&terms=heal
th+care+wait+time.
25. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 526.
26. See Canada’s Health Care System, HEALTH CANADA (Oct. 9, 2010),
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/pubs/system-regime/2005-hcs-sss/indexeng.php.
27. See id.
28. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 524.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 525.
31. Jay Makarenko, Canadian Federalism and Public Health Care: The
Evolution of Federal-Provincial Relations, MAPLELEAFWEB.COM (Jan. 30,
2008),
http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/canadian-federalism-andpublic-health-care-evolution-federal-provincial-relations.
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er control over the administration of their health care systems.32 In order to cover the money that the federal government was no longer providing, some provinces implemented
such controversial measures as collecting user fees and extra
billing, which threatened some provincial citizens’ access to
health care.33 In 1984, Canada passed the Canada Health Act,
which reinstated the program for federal reimbursement of
health care costs, created penalties for imposing user fees and
extra billing, and imposed requirements for receiving federal
reimbursement.34 The central tenets of the Canada Health Act
are public administration, comprehensive coverage of “medically necessary” services, universal coverage of all provincial citizens, continuous coverage even if the citizen is outside of the
province or the country, and reasonable access to services.35
As will be demonstrated in Part IV, the Canada Health Act’s
tenet of universal access and the role of the provinces in financing the health care system are important factors in making the
Cost Recovery Act beneficial to tobacco plaintiffs.
II. TOBACCO LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Tobacco litigation in the United States has been described as
taking part in three waves.36 The first two waves were largely
unsuccessful for plaintiffs, as individual claimants struggled to
make headway against a tobacco industry that refused to settle.37 However, the states found huge success during the third
wave of litigation when they entered into the Master Settle-

32. Jay Makarenko, The Canada Health Act: Provisions & Administration,
MAPLELEAFWEB.COM
(Mar.
1,
2007),
http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/canada-health-act-provisions-ampadministration [hereinafter Marenko Provisions]. In order to receive the federal subsidies, provinces were required to implement their health insurance
systems according to federal guidelines which included expansive coverage of
hospital and physician services. Nelson, supra note 18, at 525.
33. See Makarenko Provisions, supra note 32.
34. Nelson, supra note 18, at 525.
35. See id.
36. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron Twerski, Reaching Equilibrium
in Tobacco Litigation, 62 S.C. L. REV. 67, 70 (2010).
37. See Stephen E. Smith, “Counterblastes” To Tobacco: Five Decades of
North American Tobacco Litigation, 14 W.R.L.S.I. 1, 6 (2002); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 74.
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ment Agreement with tobacco manufacturers.38 Tobacco litigation in Canada has mimicked this course of development, with
British Columbia’s health care cost recovery suit ultimately
finding success in the Supreme Court of Canada.39
A. History of Tobacco Litigation in the United States
The first wave of tobacco litigation in the United States began in the 1950s and continued through the 1960s.40 During
this era of tobacco litigation, individual plaintiffs found little
success,41 in part because at the time tobacco companies could
not have known about the health risks of smoking cigarettes.42
Another obstacle to plaintiffs’ success during the first wave of
litigation was the need to prove specific causation.43 Even if a
plaintiff proved that cigarettes were generally harmful and
contributed to cancer and other illnesses, it was very difficult
for a plaintiff to prove that her particular injuries were caused
by smoking.44 The tobacco companies refused to settle any lawsuits during the first wave of litigation and forced plaintiffs to
expend a great deal of personal resources in taking their claims
to trial.45
The second wave of tobacco litigation in the United States
took place from the 1980s to the early 1990s, and was equally
unsuccessful for the plaintiffs.46 This second wave was precipitated by an increased awareness in the American public regarding the dangers of cigarette smoking following the release
of the U.S. Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health
in 1964.47 In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette La38. See Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the
Public Welfare: Lessons from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 WIDENER
L. REV. 159, 161 (2011).
39. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42.
40. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 70.
41. See Smith, supra note 37, at 6.
42. See id. at 10–11.
43. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 70–71.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 71.
46. Smith, supra note 37, at 14–19.
47. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH:
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE (1964); see also Report of the Surgeon General, NAT’L
LIBRARY OF MED., http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/NN/pnid/60/p-docs/true (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
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beling and Advertising Act, which required that warning labels
be displayed on cigarette packaging.48 Ironically, Congress’ efforts to educate the public regarding the dangers of tobacco
would ultimately prove to protect tobacco manufacturers during the second wave of tobacco litigation.49 Tobacco manufacturers argued in Cipollone v. Liggett Group that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and other statutes like
it (the “Cigarette Acts”) preempted plaintiffs from claiming
that the tobacco manufacturers had failed to warn them of the
dangers of smoking. 50 In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court
preempted all failure-to-warn tort claims based on state law
that post-dated the Cigarette Acts.51 While the Court held that
fraud and express warranty claims were not preempted, those
claims were difficult to establish during the second wave era.52
The tobacco manufacturers continued their “no settlement” policy during the second wave of tobacco litigation, leaving individual plaintiffs little chance of success.53
The third wave of tobacco litigation began in the mid-1990s.54
At the beginning of the third wave, plaintiffs were poised to
find success because documents produced from the tobacco
manufacturers’ files during congressional hearings strengthened plaintiffs’ fraud claims that the manufacturers misrepresented the health hazards of smoking.55 In addition, plaintiffs
began utilizing class action suits to pool resources.56 The third
wave also featured state governments filing claims for recovery
of Medicaid expenses paid to treat tobacco related illnesses.57
Mississippi was the first state to file such a claim in 1994, and
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1965).
49. See Smith, supra note 36, at 14.
50. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
51. See id.
52. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 73. In a fraud claim, the
plaintiff would argue that the tobacco manufacturer fraudulently misrepresented the health hazards of smoking in their advertising. Cipollone, 505
U.S. at 527–29. Similarly, in breach of express warranty claims the plaintiff
would argue that the tobacco manufacturer’s advertising statements affirmed
that their products were not dangerous to the smoker’s health and therefore
created an express warranty to the consumer. Id. at 525–27.
53. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 74.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Smith, supra note 37, at 18.
57. See id. at 22.

1276

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

by 1998 all fifty states had filed a cost recovery lawsuit against
tobacco manufacturers.58
In 1998, the tobacco manufacturers ended their long-held policy of refusing to settle and signed the Master Settlement
Agreement (“MSA”) that ended the Medicaid reimbursement
lawsuits and precluded the states from bringing any similar
litigation against the tobacco manufacturers in the United
States in the future.59 Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and Minnesota reached separate settlement agreements with the tobacco
manufacturers. 60 As part of the MSA, tobacco manufacturers
agreed to pay the states US$206 billion over twenty-five years,
with subsequent additional payments determined by the
amount of cigarettes sold.61 In addition, the tobacco manufacturers agreed to fund public anti-smoking education efforts,
disbanded organizations that promoted the industry’s interests—such as the Tobacco Institute—and ceased advertising
targeted towards young people.62
While the MSA may have contributed to lower rates of tobacco consumption, it is not without its flaws.63 Some have argued
that the MSA is an inefficient way of collecting a de facto cigarette excise tax.64 This criticism inherently implicates a question of legislative primacy: does the MSA “[sidestep] the democratic process” normally required to impose taxes? 65 Others
have suggested that it may violate the Social Security Act,66
federal anti-trust law,67 or the U.S. Constitution.68 Another important criticism of the MSA is that it does not dedicate money
58. See id.
59. See id. at 23.
60. See Sloan & Chepke, supra note 38, at 166.
61. See id. at 161.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Robert W. Bauer, Sanders v. Brown: State-Action Immunity
and Judicial Protection of the Master Settlement Agreement, 34 J. CORP. L.
1291, 1291–92 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 365 (2005);
Cupp World, supra note 15, at 301–02; Sloan & Chepke, supra note 38, at
163.
65. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 301–02.
66. See Gregory W. Traylor, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and
the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081
(2010).
67. See Sloan & Chepke, supra note 38, at 179–82.
68. See id. at 174–79.
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paid by tobacco manufacturers to smoking cessation programs
or even to health care.69 The money that the states collect can
be used for any purpose, including “infrastructure, prisons, or
tax cuts.”70
Despite its criticisms, the MSA represents an important development in United States tobacco litigation. Plaintiffs, in this
case states seeking recovery of health care costs, were finally
able to succeed against the tobacco industry. As the next section discusses, the development of tobacco litigation in Canada
followed the same path—individual plaintiffs initially struggling, with provincial health care recovery suits later finding
success.
B. History of Tobacco Litigation in Canada
Until recently, tobacco litigation in Canada has seen much
less activity than in the United States, and has been much
more favorable to defendants.71 The first tobacco suit in Canada, Perron v. R.J.R. Macdonald Inc., was filed in 1988 but was
dismissed because the statute of limitations had expired.72 The
next tobacco suit filed in Canada, Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco
Ltd., asserted a class action claim in 1995 on behalf of “all residents of Ontario, whether living or now deceased, who have ever smoked cigarette products manufactured . . . by the defendants.” 73 In 2004, the Caputo class was decertified because
plaintiffs had “combined at least five, and possibly more, classes, not to mention innumerable subclasses, into one globally
defined class for the purpose of seeking certification. In adopting this strategy, the plaintiffs ha[d] presented an action lacking a core of commonality.”74 In 1997, an individual claimant

69. See Smith, supra note 37, at 23.
70. Id.
71. See Smith, supra note 37, at 27; Cupp World, supra note 15, at 290–91.
72. See Perron v. R.J.R. Macdonald Inc., 1993 CanLII 1125 (BC SC) (Can.).
73. Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2004 CanLII 24753 (ON SC) (Can.).
74. Id. To satisfy the commonality requirement, plaintiffs must demonstrate “a single class sharing substantial ‘common issues,’ the resolution of
which will significantly advance the claim of each class member.” Id. para.
45.
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brought suit against tobacco manufacturers in Spasic v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. and the case is still being litigated.75
By the time the MSA was signed in the late 1990s, tobacco
litigation in Canada was relatively undeveloped compared to
American tobacco litigation; only three cases had ever been
filed against tobacco manufacturers for tobacco related illnesses in Canada, with none of the plaintiffs finding success.76
However, in 1997, the British Columbia legislature passed
the Cost Recovery Act, which allowed British Columbia to sue
tobacco manufacturers to recover provincial funds spent treating smoking related illnesses.77 In 1998, the British Columbia
legislature amended the Cost Recovery Act to include language
that directed courts to presume that exposure to tobacco products had caused the plaintiff’s illness if the defendant had
breached any “common law, equitable or statutory duty or obligation owed to persons in British Columbia who have been exposed or might become exposed to the type of tobacco product.”78 Later that year, British Columbia filed the first cost recovery action brought by a provincial government against tobacco manufacturers in Canadian courts.79 However, the British Columbia Supreme Court struck down the Cost Recovery
Act in 2000, on the grounds that the British Columbia legislature lacked the constitutional authority to target legislation at
companies that were not headquartered in British Columbia.80
The legislature subsequently amended the Cost Recovery Act
to remove the unconstitutional extra-territoriality language.81
British Columbia filed R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. the
day the amended statute was enacted.82 The tobacco manufacturers again challenged the constitutionality of the statute and
argued that the amended Cost Recovery Act was ultra vires for
extraterritoriality, contrary to the rule of law, and inconsistent

75. See Spasic v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2003 CanLII 32909 (ON SC)
(Can.). See also Tobacco Litigation: The Canadian Effort to Hold Tobacco
Companies Accountable, SMOKE-FREE.CA (last visited Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.smoke-free.ca/litigation/webpages/Spasic.htm.
76. See Smith, supra note 37, at 26–28.
77. See id. at 28.
78. Id.
79. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 291.
80. See JTI-MacDonald v. AG-BC, [2000] BCSC 0312 (Can.).
81. See Smith, supra note 37, at 29.
82. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 292.
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with judicial independence. 83 In 2005, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the amended Cost Recovery Act as constitutional.84 The court held that, because of the “strong relationships among the enacting territory (British Columbia), the subject matter of the law (compensation for the government of
British Columbia’s tobacco-related health care costs) and the
persons made subject to it (the tobacco manufacturers ultimately responsible for those costs),” the Cost Recovery Act was
“meaningfully connected to the province” and therefore not unconstitutional for extraterritoriality.85
In addition to the extraterritoriality challenge, the tobacco
manufacturers challenged the Act for interfering with judicial
independence, alleging that it interfered with the adjudicative
role of courts.86 They argued that by forcing the court to presume that the injured British Columbians “would not have
been exposed to the [tobacco] product but for the [breach of
common law, equitable, or statutory duty] . . . and the exposure
. . . caused or contributed to the disease,”87 the statute compelled the court to make “irrational presumptions.”88 The defendants attacked this section of the Cost Recovery Act because
it eliminated one of their defenses.89
The tobacco manufacturers also argued that the Cost Recovery Act was inconsistent with judicial independence because it
“[subverted] the court’s ability to discover relevant facts.” 90
They argued that the Cost Recovery Act hindered the court’s
fact finding ability by not requiring the plaintiff to “identify
83. See F.C. DeCoste, Tradition and the Rule of Law in British Columbia
v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 24 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 327, 329
(2006).
84. See British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R.
473 (Can.).
85. Id. para. 37. The tobacco companies argued “that the rule of law requires that legislation: (1) be prospective; (2) be general in character; (3) not
confer special privileges on the government, except where necessary for effective governance; and (4) ensure a fair civil trial.” Id. para. 63. However, the
court held that “none of these requirements enjoy constitutional protection in
Canada.” Id. para. 64.
86. Id. para. 48.
87. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c.
30, §3(2).
88. British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, para. 48.
89. As will be discussed in Part IV, this section of the Cost Recovery Act
addresses the tobacco manufacturer’s causation arguments.
90. See British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, para. 48.
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particular individual insured persons, to prove the cause of tobacco related disease in any particular individual insured person, or to prove the cost of health care benefits for any particular individual insured person.” 91 Again, the defendants were
attacking a section of the Cost Recovery Act that attenuated
one of their strongest defenses—their assumption of risk argument.
The court noted that the Cost Recovery Act was “not as unfair or illogical” as the tobacco manufacturers claimed because
the rules in the Cost Recovery Act “[reflected] legitimate policy
concerns of the British Columbia legislature regarding the systemic advantages tobacco manufacturers enjoy when claims for
tobacco-related harm are litigated through individualistic
common law tort actions.”92 The crucial question addressed by
the supreme court was “not whether the Act’s rules [were] unfair or illogical . . . but whether they interfere[d] with the
court’s adjudicative role, and thus judicial independence.”93 The
court found the statute was constitutional, despite the fact that
it shifted the burden of proof and limited the tobacco manufacturer’s ability to compel discovery of an individual’s medical
records, because it did not interfere with the court’s central
function of adjudicating disputes.94 In so holding, the Canadian
Supreme Court affirmed two important sections of the Cost Recovery Act that lend themselves favorably to provincial plaintiffs in tobacco litigation.95 The ruling also provided a judicial
blueprint for upholding similar legislation in the future. 96 If
Canada were to pass a statute similar to the Cost Recovery Act
aimed at food litigation, the Canadian courts would have a
strong precedent in upholding the statute from similar attacks.
C. The Canadian Supreme Court’s Decision in R. v. Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd.
Though the tobacco manufacturer’s arguments failed to render the Cost Recovery Act unconstitutional in 2005, the manu-

91. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c.
30, §2(5).
92. British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, para. 49.
93. Id.
94. Id. at para. 55.
95. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 296–97.
96. See British Columbia v. Imperial, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473.
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facturers continued trying to limit their liability. 97 Tobacco
manufacturers would next attempt to divert blame by impleading the Canadian federal government.98
In the 1950s and 1960s, as worldwide awareness of the
health risks of smoking began to grow, Canada adopted a public health policy to encourage citizens to smoke light cigarettes.
It was commonly believed at the time that light cigarettes were
less harmful than regular cigarettes.99 Pursuant to this policy,
the Canadian government advised and assisted tobacco manufacturers in developing strains of low-tar tobacco.100
In light of Canada’s former policy, on June 6, 2007, the tobacco manufacturers filed a third-party claim impleading the Canadian federal government in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada
Ltd., British Columbia’s cost recovery suit.101 The tobacco companies argued that Canada should be held liable as a “manufacturer”102 under the Cost Recovery Act for the role it played
97. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42.
98. See id.
99. In the 1950s, an emerging awareness of the dangers of cigarette smoking started to grow and Canada, recognizing the health risk, began funding
research into the link between cigarettes and cancer. See British Columbia v.
Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, [2009] B.C.C.A. 540, para. 18 (Can.). In
1963, Canada began an anti-smoking program designed to “encourage people
to limit or stop smoking, to take steps to inform the public of smoking risks
and to conduct research into manufacturing a less hazardous cigarette.” Id.
para. 19. In the mid-1960s, Canada determined that, despite the public
awareness of the dangers of smoking, some people would continue to smoke.
Id. para. 22–23. At the time, it was believed that cigarettes with lower levels
of tar and nicotine (light cigarettes) were less harmful. Id.
100. Relying on this theory, Canada “gave advice, made requests or gave
directions to cigarette manufacturers about the development and promotion
of light and mild products” and helped to “develop strains of tobacco particularly suitable for use in light and mild products that were eventually sold to
consumers in British Columbia.” Id. In 1973, the Canadian Minister of
Health “announced that officials of Health Canada and Agriculture Canada
along with the tobacco industry were endeavoring to develop strains of tobacco that would lower tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes.” Id. para. 24. Between 1979 and 1983, Canada developed several varieties of low tar tobacco.
Id. para. 25. By 1983, 95% of tobacco available to manufacturers was developed by Agriculture Canada and “nearly all tobacco products consumed in
British Columbia were manufactured from these varieties.” Id.
101. See Third Party Notice of Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, British
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, 2008 BCSC 419 (Can.).
102. Under the Cost Recovery Act, a “manufacturer” is defined as “a person
who manufactures or has manufactured a tobacco product and includes a
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in the development of low-tar tobacco.103 They also argued that
if they were found liable to British Columbia for reimbursement of health care costs, they were “entitled to compensation
from Canada for negligent misrepresentation, negligent design,
and failure to warn.”104 In filing this third-party petition, the
tobacco manufacturers were falling back onto the tactic of prolonging the litigation; a tactic that had proved successful for

person who currently or in the past (a) causes, directly or indirectly, through
arrangements with contractors, subcontractors, licensees, franchisees or others, the manufacture of a tobacco product, (b) for any fiscal year of the person,
derives at least 10% of revenues, determined on a consolidated basis in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in Canada, from the
manufacture or promotion of tobacco products by that person or by other persons, (c) engages in, or causes, directly or indirectly, other persons to engage
in the promotion of a tobacco product, or (d) is a trade association primarily
engaged in (i) the advancement of the interests of manufacturers, (ii) the
promotion of a tobacco product, or (iii) causing, directly or indirectly, other
persons to engage in the promotion of a tobacco product.” Tobacco Damages
and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c. 30, §1.
103. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 12–13. Regarding the tobacco companies’ argument that Canada qualified as a “manufacturer” under the
Cost Recovery Act, the court held that the statute’s reference to “revenue percentage” and “market share” showed that the British Columbia “legislature
did not intend to include the federal government as a potential manufacturer.” Id. para. 124–25. The court determined that “holding Canada accountable under the CRA would defeat the legislature’s intention of transferring the
health-care costs resulting from tobacco related wrongs from taxpayers to the
tobacco industry.” Id. para. 120.
104. See id. para. 2. The court dismissed the tobacco companies’ negligent
design and failure to warn claims against Canada on the same theory of sovereign immunity that they applied to the negligent misrepresentation claim.
Id. para. 105, 111. However, the court failed to reconsider the conduct at issue when deciding whether to dismiss those claims. Id. The court could have
separated the two types of conduct, and applied the most appropriate conduct
to each claim, which would have greatly affected the court’s analysis of the
different conduct at issue. For instance, in deciding the negligent design
claim, the court held that “the decision to develop low-tar strains of tobacco
on the belief that the resulting cigarettes would be less harmful to health is a
decision that constitutes a course or principle of action based on Canada’s
health policy. It was a decision based on social and economic factors.” Id. para. 116. It is interesting to consider whether this claim would have been dismissed for policy considerations under Canada’s previously dominant “policy/operational test.” It could be argued that the decision to advocate light
cigarettes as more healthy was a policy decision, and that developing and
selling strains of tobacco were operational actions designed to carry out the
overall policy of healthier smoking.
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the tobacco industry in the past when plaintiffs with fewer resources were unable to maintain years of litigation.105
On July 29, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed
the federal government as a third party.106 In deciding whether
to dismiss the tobacco companies’ claim for negligent misrepresentation, the court first examined whether policy concerns
outweighed Canada’s duty of care in its role as advisor to the
tobacco manufacturers.107 The court focused its policy discussion on Canada’s assertions regarding the health benefits of
smoking light cigarettes over regular cigarettes, rather than
Canada’s “role in developing and growing a strain of low-tar
tobacco and collecting royalties on the product.”108 Canada argued that its statements were made in support of its policy decision to encourage healthier smoking habits and that “[t]rue
policy decisions should be exempt from tortious claims so that
governments are not restricted in making decisions based upon

105. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 74.
106. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42.
107. See id. para. 47. The court first determined whether the claim had a
“reasonable prospect of success.” Id. para. 17. To determine the prospect of
success, the court considered whether “the general requirements for liability
in tort are met.” Id. para. 38. The first part of this test asks “whether the
facts disclose a relationship of proximity in which failure to take reasonable
care might foreseeably cause loss or harm to the plaintiff.” Id. para. 39. On
this first issue, the court held that such a relationship did exist because
“Canada assumed the role of adviser to a finite number of manufacturers and
that there were commercial relationships entered into between Canada and
the companies based in part on the advice given to the companies by government officials.” Id. para. 53. The court went on to hold that “Canada’s regulatory powers over the manufacturers, coupled with its specific advice and its
commercial involvement” made the tobacco manufacturers’ reliance on Canada reasonable. Id. para. 54.
108. Id. para. 67. In determining the conduct at issue for the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court found that the tobacco manufacturers had
“merged the two types of conduct [Canada’s representation that low-tar tobacco was less harmful and Canada’s role in developing low-tar tobacco], emphasizing aspects that cast Canada in the role of business operator in the
tobacco industry.” Id. The court held that “in considering negligent misrepresentation, only the first type of conduct—conduct relevant to statements and
representations made by Canada—is at issue.” Id. By focusing solely on Canada’s statements regarding the health impact of low-tar tobacco, the court
was able to effectively ignore the impact that Canada’s actions had on the
issue of state immunity.
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social, political or economic factors.” 109 The tobacco manufacturers argued that Canada’s assertions represented “operational acts” designed to carry out the overall policy to support
healthier smoking habits.110
D. Sovereign Immunity in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.
In reaching its decision in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada
Ltd., the Canadian Supreme Court triggered a subtle but important shift in sovereign immunity doctrine.111 Generally, in
common law countries, “government policy decisions are not
justiciable and cannot give rise to tort liability.” 112 However,
“governments may attract liability in tort where government
agents are negligent in carrying out prescribed duties. The
problem is to devise a workable test to distinguish these situations.”113 Accordingly, the court first looked to Canadian precedent to determine an appropriate test.114
The first test, the “discretionary decision” approach, “holds
that public authorities should be exempt from liability if they
are acting within their discretion, unless the challenged decision is irrational.”115 The court noted that, because “many decisions can be characterized as to some extent discretionary,”
this test “has the potential to create an overbroad exemption
for the conduct of governmental actors.”116 While it can be tempered to “narrow the scope of the discretion,”117 this test did not

109. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 63 (citing Just v. British
Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, para. 1240 (Can.)).
110. R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 64.
111. Id.
112. Id. para. 72.
113. Id. The court recognized the issue of policy considerations as “vexing,”
noting that “much judicial ink has been spilled” analyzing the problem. Id.
The court noted, “[o]n the one hand, it is important for public authorities to
be liable in general for their negligent conduct in light of the pervasive role
that they play in all aspects of society. Exempting all government actions
from liability would result in intolerable outcomes. On the other hand, ‘the
Crown is not a person and must be free to govern and make true policy decisions without becoming subject to tort liability as a result of those decisions.’”
Id. para. 76 (citing Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, para. 1239
(Can.)).
114. R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 72–78.
115. Id. para. 73.
116. Id. para. 77.
117. Id.
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become the predominant approach in Canadian jurisprudence.118
The second test, the “policy/operational test” seeks to determine “which ‘true’ policy decisions are distinguished from ‘operational’ decisions, which seek to carry out settled policy.”119
While the policy/operational test became the dominant approach in Canada, it is not always easy to determine when a
decision should be characterized as a policy decision or an operational decision.120 As the court noted,
Even low-level state employees may enjoy some discretion related to how much money is in the budget or which of a range
of tasks is most important at a particular time. Is the decision
of a social worker when to visit a troubled home, or the decision of a snow-plow operator when to sand an icy road, a policy decision or an operational decision?121

With this difficulty in mind, the court also considered the approaches to sovereign immunity in the United Kingdom, 122
Australia,123 and the United States124 in determining an appropriate test for protected policy decisions.125
118. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 74.
119. Id.
120. See id. para. 78.
121. Id.
122. In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords adopted a justiciability test
in Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council. Id. para. 79. This test seeks to
determine “whether the court is institutionally capable of deciding on the
question, or ‘whether the court should accept that it has no role to play.’” Id.
(citing Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council, [2001] 2 A.C. 550, 571
(appeal taken from Eng.)). The Imperial court recognized that this test may
be as unworkable as the discretionary decision and policy/operational approaches when it noted that the “long judicial voyage” ended with “a test that
essentially restates the question. When should the court hold that a government decision is protected from negligence liability? When the court concludes that the matter is one for the government and not the courts.” R. v.
Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 79
123. The two leading Australian cases on the issue, Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman and Pyrenees Shire Council v. Day, both found a court split on
which approach to take. Id. para. 80. In Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman,
Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Wilson “adopted the Dorset Yacht rule that
all discretionary decisions are immune,” and “endorsed the policy/operational
distinctions as a logical test for discerning which decisions should be protected.” Id. Justice Mason adopted an approach which the Imperial court dubbed
a “core policy,” id., approach when he held that “the dividing line between
[policy and operation] will be observed if we recognize that a public authority
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The Imperial court synthesized their multinational tour of
sovereign immunity law into three basic observations. First,
because “even routine tasks . . . like driving a government vehicle” involve discretion, tests “based simply on the exercise of
government discretion . . . [cast] the net of immunity too broadis under no duty of care in relation to decisions which involve or are dictated
by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints.” Sutherland
Shire Council v. Heyman (1985), 157 C.L.R. 424, para. 39 (Austl.). In Pyrenees Shire Council v. Day, the court was again divided with three justices
adopting the Dorset Yacht rule and two justices adopting “different versions
of the policy/operational distinction.” R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, at para.
80.
124. In 1946, the United States waived immunity from tort claims in the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. para. 81. The Act created exemptions for discretionary functions, excluding liability in tort for “any claim . . . based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of the federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680
(a)(2006). In Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the discretionary function exception “protects only governmental actions
and decisions based on considerations of public policy,” because it “was Congress’ desire to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through
the medium of an action in tort.” Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. U.S., 486 U.S.
531, 536–37 (1988) (citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814
(1984)). In 1991, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Gaubert held that the “focus of
the inquiry is . . . on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are
susceptible to policy analysis.” U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991). In
concurrence, Justice Scalia supported a policy/operational distinction as “relevant to the discretionary function inquiry,” but felt that the decision maker’s
position of authority should influence the court’s discretionary function analysis. Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia wrote:
[N]ot only is it necessary for application of the discretionary function
exception that the decision maker be an official who possesses the
relevant policy responsibility, but also the decision maker’s close
identification with policymaking can be strong evidence that the other half of the test is met—i.e., that the subject matter of the decision
is one that ought to be informed by policy considerations . . . This
immunity represents an absolute statutory presumption, so to speak,
that all regulations involve policy judgments that must not be interfered with. I think there is a similar presumption, though not an absolute one, that decisions reserved to policymaking levels involve
such judgments—and the higher the policymaking level, the stronger
the presumption.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. See R. v. Imperial, [2011] S.C.C. 42, para. 79–83.
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ly.”126 Second, all jurisdictions support immunity from tort for
“core policy” decisions.127 Finally, defining a core policy decision
as “not operational” can be problematic because “decisions in
real life may not fall neatly into one category or the other.”128
With these observations in mind, the court concluded that “core
policy government decisions protected from suit are decisions
as to a course or principle of action that are based on public
policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in bad
faith.”129
Applying this new “core policy” test to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court asked “whether the alleged representations of Canada to the tobacco companies that low-tar cigarettes are less harmful to health are matters of policy, in the
sense that they constitute a course or principle of action of the
government.” 130 The court dismissed the tobacco manufacturer’s third-party claim because Canada’s representations were
“part and parcel of a government policy to encourage people
who continued to smoke to switch to low-tar cigarettes.”131
In R. v. Imperial Tobacco, the tobacco manufacturers were
attempting to strategically muddy the waters of the litigation.
Impleading the Canadian federal government benefited the tobacco manufacturers not only by potentially limiting their liability for repayment of the provincial medical costs, but also by
prolonging any ultimate judgment on those central issues. By
introducing complex legal questions unrelated to their own liability, the tobacco manufacturers were able to derail the litigation for over four years. However, the court’s decision refocused
126. Id. para. 84.
127. Id. para. 85.
128. Id. para. 86.
129. Id. para. 90. The court noted that this “core policy” approach was not a
“black and white test” because “difficult cases may be expected to arise from
time to time here it is not easy to decide whether the degree of ‘policy’ involved suffices for protection from negligence liability.” Id. Nevertheless, the
court was confident that “core policy” decisions would be “readily identifiable.” Id.
130. Id. para. 92.
131. Id. para. 95. The court noted that the “course of action was adopted at
the highest level in the Canadian government . . . involved social and economic considerations,” and was “developed . . . out of concern for the health of
Canadians and the individual and institutional costs associated with tobaccorelated disease.” Id.
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the course of the litigation on the parties at the heart of the
Cost Recovery Act—provincial plaintiffs seeking health care
costs from tobacco manufacturers.132
III. ISSUES IN FAST FOOD LITIGATION
In claims against food manufacturers or retailers, plaintiffs
seeking damages for the food’s contribution to their obesity
have faced difficult issues involving causation and assumption
of risk.133 An examination of food litigation in the United States
will demonstrate the issues involved in fast food litigation, including causation and assumption of risk arguments. As discussed in Part II, these are the same arguments that were utilized by the tobacco manufacturers in tobacco litigation.134
One of the most well-known fast food litigation cases in the
United States is Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.135 In Pelman, two
minors sued the fast food restaurant McDonalds claiming,
among other things, that “McDonalds acted at least negligently
in selling food products that are high in cholesterol, fat, salt
and sugar when studies show that such foods cause obesity and
detrimental health effects.”136
One of the weaknesses of the plaintiffs’ claims in Pelman137 is
common to food litigation in general. The Pelman court elegantly expressed this issue, asking “where should the line be
drawn between an individual’s own responsibility to take care
of herself, and society’s responsibility to ensure that others
shield her?”138 The court held that “if consumers know (or reasonably should know) the potential ill health effects of eating at
McDonalds, they cannot blame McDonalds if they, nonetheless,
choose to satiate their appetite with a surfeit of supersized
McDonalds products.”139 The Pelman court dismissed the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, holding that “it is well-known that fast
food in general, and McDonalds’ products in particular, contain
high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar, and that such

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See generally id.
See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
See Courtney, supra note 17, at 99.
See Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d.
Id. at 520.
See id. at 516.
Id.
Id. at 517–18.
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attributes are bad for one.”140 In so holding, the Pelman court is
essentially addressing a problem of assumption of risk.141 The
plaintiff is barred from recovery if he or she knew that eating
certain foods would lead to obesity, yet chose to continue eating
them despite the risk of adverse health implications. 142 This
same issue has arisen in tobacco litigation where the health
hazards of smoking have long been well known. 143 Tobacco
manufacturers have made the same argument that the food
manufacturer made in Pelman: if a plaintiff knew about the
health hazards of smoking and continued to smoke, they should
be barred from recovery.144
The Pelman court pointed out another issue that plaintiffs
face in food litigation when it noted that “a number of factors
other than diet may come into play in obesity and the health
problems of which plaintiffs complain.”145 Essentially, the Pelman court was addressing the issue of causation; that is, when
an injury has several possible causes, courts may have difficulty assigning liability to one possible cause over another.146 For
instance, in addition to diet, obesity can also be influenced by
genetic factors.147 Therefore, McDonalds argued in Pelman that
the plaintiffs’ obesity was hereditary, as opposed to being
caused by eating McDonald’s food.148 Obesity can also increase
the risk of heart disease;149 however, propensity for heart disease can be hereditary.150 Coincidentally, smoking also contrib140. Id. at 532.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 864 (1992).
144. See Courtney, supra note 17, at 99.
145. See Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d at 539.
146. Id.
147. See Health Lifestyles: Obesity, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN HEALTH SYSTEM (last
visited
Oct.
29,
2011),
http://dwb4.unl.edu/Chem/CHEM869P/CHEM869PLinks/www.med.umich.ed
u/1libr/primry/life13.htm.
148. See Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d at 539.
149. See Obesity Information, AM. HEART ASS’N (last updated May 5, 2011),
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/GettingHealthy/WeightManagement/Obes
ity/Obesity-Information_UCM_307908_Article.jsp#.TqwwqJuIm0s.
150. See William Haynes, Risk Factors for Heart Disease: Frequently Asked
OF
IOWA
HOSP.
&
CLINICS
(Jan.
2004),
Questions,
UNIV.
http://www.uihealthcare.com/topics/medicaldepartments/internalmedicine/he
artriskfactors/index.html.

1290

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

utes to heart disease.151 Therefore, both tobacco manufacturers
and fast food retailers could argue that a plaintiff’s heart disease was hereditary, as opposed to being caused by smoking
cigarettes or eating hamburgers.
Another causation issue that the Pelman court addressed was
that “any number of other factors then potentially could have
affected the plaintiffs’ weight and health . . . the more often a
plaintiff had eaten at McDonalds, the stronger the likelihood
that it was the McDonalds’ food (as opposed to other foods) that
affected the plaintiffs’ health.”152 Unless an obese plaintiff only
ate at one fast food restaurant in his or her life, any single fast
food manufacturer will have an argument similar to the previous causation argument. In Pelman, McDonalds argued that
the plaintiffs’ obesity was not caused by McDonald’s food, but
rather by the food from a different fast food restaurant. 153
Again, defendants in food litigation and tobacco litigation have
the same argument at their disposal. For instance, the Newport cigarette company could have argued that a plaintiff’s cancer was caused by smoking Marlboro cigarettes.
The Pelman court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims holding
that the complaint failed “to allege with sufficient specificity
that the McDonalds’ products were a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs’ obesity and health problems.”154 In Pelman, issues of
assumption of risk and proximate causation represented stumbling blocks for plaintiffs in food litigation.155 However, just as
defendants in food litigation and tobacco litigation can use
these arguments to rebut a plaintiff’s claim, the Cost Recovery
Act and the subsequent tobacco litigation can be used to overcome food and tobacco defendants’ assumption of risk and proximate causation defenses.

151. See,
e.g.,
Why
Quit
Smoking?,
AM.
HEART
ASS’N,
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/GettingHealthy/QuitSmoking/QuittingSm
oking/Why-Quit-Smoking_UCM_307847_Article.jsp#.TqwysZuIm0s (last updated Aug. 30, 2011).
152. Pelman, 237 F.Supp.2d at 538-539.
153. See id. at 539.
154. Id. at 540.
155. See id.
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IV. PROVISIONS OF THE COST RECOVERY ACT THAT ARE
BENEFICIAL TO FOOD LITIGATION PLAINTIFFS
The current Cost Recovery Act contains several provisions
that would benefit plaintiffs in food litigation by reducing their
vulnerability to assumption of risk and causation arguments.
The first provision specifically authorizes Canadian provinces
to initiate cost recovery suits on behalf of patients treated for
tobacco related illnesses.156 The Cost Recovery Act section 2(1)
provides that “the government has a direct and distinct action
against a manufacturer to recover the cost of health care benefits caused or contributed to by a tobacco related wrong.” 157
Section 2(4)(b) provides that “in an action under subsection (1),
the government may recover the cost of health care benefits . . .
on an aggregate basis, for a population of insured persons as a
result of exposure to a type of tobacco product.”158
This was an important provision for plaintiffs in overcoming
the assumption of risk defense raised by tobacco manufacturers. There are two theories that address how cost recovery suits
involving government entities rebut the assumption of risk argument in tobacco cases.159 The first theory posits that the suit
places the assumption of risk “one step removed because the
states were suing on behalf of smokers.” 160 Because it is the
provincial government that is bringing the lawsuit seeking reimbursement for health care costs, the cause of action is “one
step removed” from the injured smoker who chose to use tobacco products.161
The second theory of how cost recovery suits involving government entities rebut the assumption of risk argument in tobacco cases is the unjust enrichment theory.162 This theory differs from the “one-step-removed” theory in that it does not as-

156. Cupp World, supra note 15, at 291.
157. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c.
30, §2(1).
158. Id. §2(4)(b).
159. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After
Tobacco: Is the Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair
Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 696 (2000) [hereinafter Cupp Domino]; see also
Traylor, supra note 66, at 1097 n.107.
160. See Cupp Domino, supra note 159, at 696.
161. Id. at 689.
162. See Traylor, supra note 66, at 1097 n.107.
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sume that “the states were suing on behalf of smokers.”163 Instead, it posits that, “the states were suing on behalf of taxpayers who bore the financial burden of Medicaid-covered smokers’
health care.”164 The unjust enrichment theory argues that these
taxpayers “expended hundreds of millions of dollars in caring
for their fellow citizens,” and tobacco manufacturers were “unjustly enriched to the extent that [the] taxpayers have had to
pay these costs.”165
Both the “one step removed” theory and the unjust enrichment theory serve to introduce a counter-argument to tobacco
manufacturers’ assumption of risk argument. The two theories
share the same underlying premise: regardless of whether the
province was suing on behalf of the smokers or the taxpayers,
it is the province that has the cause of action to recover health
care costs.166 The injury suffered by the smoker (illness) is susceptible to the assumption of risk argument if the smoker knew
about the health hazards associated with tobacco use.167 However, the injury suffered by the province (payment for medical
care) would not be affected by the smoker’s knowledge.168 As
was discussed in Part I, one of the central tenets of Canada’s
health care system is universal access: even smokers who knew
the health risks and still smoked are entitled to treatment.169
By assigning the injury to the province that paid the health
care costs, the Cost Recovery Act has removed the smoker that
was the target of the assumption of risk defense.170
If a statute similar to the Cost Recovery Act were enacted to
provide provinces with a direct cause of action against food retailers to recover medical costs associated with obesity, the
same counter-argument could be used by plaintiffs in food liti163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Traylor, supra note 66, at 1097 n.107 (citing Complaint at 79 & 82
Moore ex rel. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94–1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson
County May 23, 1994).
166. See, e.g., Cupp Domino, supra note 159, at 689; Traylor, supra note 66,
at 1097 n.107.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Nelson, supra note 18, at 524. Because the tenet of “universality”
guarantees health care to all citizens, even Canadian smokers would be entitled to health care.
170. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c.
30, §2(1).
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gation. If such legislation was enacted, provinces could rebut
food retailers’ assumption of risk argument by responding that
the province did not choose to eat foods high in fat and calories,
rather they are seeking reimbursement for health care costs
paid by provincial taxpayers to treat obesity related illnesses.
Another provision of the Cost Recovery Act that would be
beneficial to food litigation plaintiffs in Canada is section
2(5)(a).171 Under section 2(5)(a) of the Cost Recovery Act,
If the government seeks in an action under subsection (1) to
recover the cost of health care benefits on an aggregate basis,
it is not necessary to identify particular individual insured
persons, to prove the cause of tobacco related disease in any
particular individual insured person, or to prove the cost of
health care benefits for any particular individual insured person.172

This section of the Cost Recovery Act also limits the discovery
access to any individual patient’s testimony or medical documents, and allows the government to prove health care benefits
through “a statistically meaningful sample of documents.”173 It
also provides clear separation between the smoker’s physical
injury, and the province’s financial injury in paying medical
costs. By elucidating this distinction, section 2(5)(a) further attenuates the tobacco companies’ assumption of risk arguments
as discussed above. In addition, this section generally “[eases]
the government’s case against tobacco manufacturers” by lowering the burden of proof.174
If legislation similar to the Cost Recovery Act were passed
with a provision like section 2(5)(a), provinces could sue food
retailers to recover health care costs associated with obesity
without having to prove any individual consumer’s injury. If
such legislation were passed, it would also certainly “ease the
government’s case” against food manufacturers and fast food
retailers.175
Finally, the Cost Recovery Act also addresses the causation
issues in tobacco litigation.176 Under the Cost Recovery Act, if
171. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 525.
172. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c.
30, §2(5)(a).
173. Id. §2(5)(b)-(e).
174. Cupp World, supra note 15, at 292.
175. Id.
176. See id.
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the tobacco manufacturer “breached a common law, equitable
or statutory duty . . . the court must presume that the population of insured persons who were exposed to the . . . tobacco
product . . . would not have been exposed but for the breach.”177
In addition, if the court finds a breach, it must presume that
“the exposure . . . caused or contributed to the disease or risk of
disease.” 178 In other words, if there is a breach of duty, the
court assumes the causation requirement has been met. This
section of the Cost Recovery Act is important to provincial
plaintiffs in the tobacco litigation because it effectively nullifies
the tobacco manufacturer’s two strong causation arguments:
that the disease was caused by something other than smoking,
and that the disease was caused by the cigarettes of a different
tobacco manufacturer.179 A similar provision could be passed by
a provincial legislature authorizing provincial health care cost
recovery against food manufacturers and retailers. In the fast
food litigation context, this would eliminate a defendant’s argument that a different factor (such as heredity) caused the
plaintiff’s obesity or heart disease, or that a different fast food
restaurant (such as Burger King) caused the plaintiff’s obesity.
These provisions in the Cost Recovery Act substantially assisted the provincial plaintiff’s case against tobacco manufacturers by eliminating the tobacco defendant’s assumption of
risk and causation arguments.180 Similar legislation aimed at
food litigation in Canada would provide a great advantage to
provincial plaintiffs seeking health care cost recovery.
CONCLUSION
The pattern of litigation in the United States began with individual plaintiffs having little success against tobacco manufacturers with better resources.181 As the litigation evolved to
include class action claims and cost recovery suits, plaintiffs
were able to find success in the MSA.182 Canadian provinces
learned a valuable lesson from United States tobacco litigation
when the provinces initiated their own cost recovery suits
177. Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c.
30, §3(1)–(2).
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See Cupp World, supra note 15, at 292.
181. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 36, at 74.
182. See Smith, supra note 37, at 23.
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against tobacco manufacturers.183 The Cost Recovery Act and
the subsequent tobacco litigation in Canada demonstrated a
litigation model that has found initial success in Canadian
courts. This litigation model also provides a blueprint for
health care cost recovery lawsuits that Canadian provinces
could initiate against manufacturers and retailers in other industries, such as the food industry.
By initially commencing health care reimbursement suits
against food manufacturers, provincial plaintiffs will be able to
immediately take advantage of the benefits of class action suits
that the tobacco plaintiffs spent decades developing in the
United States and Canada. And with strong precedent focusing
cost recovery cases in Canadian courts on the central liability
of the manufacturer, provincial plaintiffs may ultimately be
successful in recouping health care costs paid to treat obesity
related illnesses.
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